We analyze a general market for an industry of competing service facilities. Other than through intrinsic and unalterable service characteristics, firms differentiate themselves in the market in terms of their price levels and the waiting time their customers experience. Our model therefore assumes that the expected demand experienced by a given firm may depend on all of the industry's price levels as well as a (steady state) waiting time standard, which each of the firms announces and commits itself to by proper adjustment of its capacity level. We define a firm's service level as the difference between an upper bound benchmark for the waiting time standard (w) and the firm's actual waiting time standard. Different types of competition and resulting equilibrium behavior may arise, depending on the industry dynamics through which the firms select their strategic choices. In one case, firms may initially select their waiting time standards, followed by a selection of their prices in a second stage (Service Level First). Alternatively, the sequence of strategic choices may be reversed (Price First) or as a third alternative, the firms may make their choices simultaneously (Simultaneous Competition). We model each of the service facilities as a single server M/M/1 queueing facility, which receives a given firm specific price for each customer served. Each firm incurs a given cost per customer served as well as cost per unit of time proportional to its adopted capacity level.
Introduction and Summary
We analyze a general market for an industry of competing service facilities. Other than through intrinsic and unalterable service characteristics, firms differentiate themselves in the market in terms of their price levels and the waiting time their customers experience.
Our model therefore assumes that the demand volume experienced by a given firm may depend on all prices level as well as all (steady state) waiting time standards of the industry's firms. The waiting time standard may either be stated in terms of the expected steady state waiting time or in terms of a given (e.g. 95th) percentile of the waiting time distribution. In some settings, see below, firms announce their chosen waiting time standard as a (collective) guarantee; in others, the waiting time standard is simply the waiting time performance as observed by the clientele or as reported by independent organizations. Sometimes, firms offer to pay any customer whose individual waiting time is in excess of the stated standard. Either way, each firm commits itself to the chosen standard by adopting a sufficiently large capacity level. Different types of competition and resulting equilibrium behavior may be envisioned, depending on the industry dynamics through which the firms select their strategic choices. In one case the firms make their choices simultaneously (Simultaneous Competition). Alternatively, firms may initially select their waiting time standards, followed by a selection of their prices in a second stage (Service Level First Competition). As a third alternative,, the sequence of strategic choices may be reversed (Price First Competition).
The service industries in which waiting time standards are used as an explicitly advertised competitive instrument have become numerous. In the Pizza delivery business, Dominos has offered a 30-minute delivery guarantee, backed up with a free of charge delivery if the time limit is exceeded. Similarly, restaurant chains such as Black Angus offer free lunches if lunch is not served within 10 minutes. Banks like Wells Fargo award five dollars to each customer who waits more than five minutes in line. Various call centers or contact centers promise that the customer will be helped within one hour, possibly by a call back. A few years ago, United Parcel Services attempted to obtain a large increase in its market share of overnight deliveries by offering a 10:00 AM guarantee as opposed to the Federal Express 11:00 AM guarantee. Supermarket chains like Lucky launched a "3 is a crowd" campaign, guaranteeing that no line in front of a checkout counter would have more than three customers waiting. Ameritrade made major inroads into the online discounted brokerage market, waiving commissions altogether, if service, for certain types of trades, takes more than 10 seconds. As a final example, airlines increasingly advertise waiting time characteristics such as the so called "on time arrival percentage", which most industry observers recognize as the dominant dimension of service, see e.g. Bowen and Headley (2001) . At the same time, independent government agencies (e.g. the Aviation Consumer Protection Division of the DOT, as well as internet travel services (e.g Expedia ) report the average delay and percentage of flights arriving within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival time, on a flight by flight basis. Mazzeo (2001) has documented that the "on time arrival percentages" are significantly higher on origin-destination pairs that are covered by a large number of competing airlines, as compared to those with a single or a small number of carriers.
When customers select a specific firm, the selection process amounts to a tradeoff among three categories of service attributes: (1) the price (2) the waiting time standard (3) all other attributes. For example, for competing mail services, the "other attributes" include the convenience of the pick-up process, the ease at which deliveries can be traced and the likelihood of the packages being damaged. In the restaurant and fast food industry, the location, ambiance and the quality of the food are important components of the third category of attributes. As another example, we mention internet service providers, whose customers consider the frequency of service interruption and the quality of the support staff along with the price and waiting time.
Prior service competition models have assumed that the first two attributes (i.e. price and waiting time) can be aggregated into a so called full price, usually defined as the direct price plus a multiple of the expected waiting time. This is tantamount to assuming that all customers assign a specific cost value to their waiting time and that the cost of waiting is simply proportional to the total waiting time. While consistent with classical economic theory (e.g. Becker (1965) ), many studies in the modern psychology, economics, marketing and operations literature have demonstrated that both assumptions are often violated. Moreover, consumers do not aggregate price and waiting times according to a more general non-linear aggregation scheme either, as in So's (2000) and Afeche and Mendelson (2004) 's model, see §2. The full price assumptions effectively reduce the customers' choice to a tradeoff between the full price and the "other attributes". Many prior models also assume that all customers select a firm with the lowest full price, albeit that different customers may be attracted to different firms because of differences in their waiting time cost rate. This, of course is equivalent to assuming that no attributes, other than price and waiting times, matter, reducing the customers' multidimensional tradeoff process to the full price as the single criterion.
Defining a firm's service level as the difference between a given upper bound benchmark for the waiting time standard and the actual waiting time standard, we represent the demand rate faced by a given firm as a separable function of all prices and service levels in the industry, which in addition is linear in the price vector. This class of demand models allows us to represent general tradeoffs between the above three categories of attributes. Price and waiting time are treated as truly independent attributes, in that, in general, a change in a firm's waiting time (distribution) can not be compensated for by a price change that will leave all firms' demand volume unchanged. It includes, as special cases, settings where customers select their service providers on the basis of the full price and "other attributes", but not, the rare case, where the choice is made exclusively on the basis of the full price value, i.e., where the customers view the service providers as entirely interchangeable. We model each of the service facilities as a single server (M/M/1) queueing facility, which receives a given firm specific price for each customer served. Each firm incurs a given cost per customer served as well as a cost per unit of time proportional to its adopted capacity level; the service rate is determined so as to satisfy the waiting time standard under the expected demand rate.
We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the above three possible ways in which prices and service levels may be selected, non-cooperatively, by the firms: (SC) Simultaneous Competition, (PF) Price First and (SF) Service Level First . We show, first of all, that in all three settings (SC),(PF) and (SF) an equilibrium pair of price and service level vectors exists, in full generality, provided the above mentioned upper bound for the waiting time standard is not excessively large. We also develop efficient procedures to compute the equilibria in the various competitive models.
These existence results represent a surprisingly pleasant contrast to the known behavior in existing service competition models. For example, the seminal competition model, due to Luski (1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) confines itself to 2 service providers, assumes all customers choose their provider strictly on the basis of the full price value, and by assuming that the service rates or capacity levels are exogenously given, it restricts the competition between the two firms to their price choices only. Whether an equilibrium exists in this elementary model, or not, remained an open question for close to 25 years, when it was answered in the affirmative by Chen and Wan (2000) for the case where the firms' service rates are identical, while under non-identical service rates an example is given where no (pure) Nash equilibrium exists. The same example shows that the equilibrium behavior is very unstable: as the total market size varies from 1.2 to 1.3, the industry moves from a unique equilibrium to no-equilibrium to an infinite number of equilibria. Cachon and Harker (2002) , again for the case of two service providers, allows each firm's demand rate to be specified as a function of both firms' full price values; in this model, customers do not necessarily patronize the provider with the lowest full price (as other attributes are taken into consideration as well.) When the demand rate functions are linear, the known equilibrium results merely exclude the existence of multiple equilibria, and this only when the demand rates are sufficiently large, see §4. When the demand rate functions are (truncated) Logit functions, the authors examine a specific symmetric numerical instance varying a single cost rate parameter . As this cost rate increases, the industry moves from a situation with a unique equilibrium under which both firms share the market to one without any equilibrium, and next to a situation with two equilibria, one with firm 1 and the other with firm 2 as the monopoly provider.
To further appreciate the significance of the existence of an equilibrium in each of the three competition settings (SC),(PF) and (SF), note that the existence results are obtained for an arbitrary number of competing service providers . In the process of analyzing the two stage games, we characterize the price (service level) equilibrium which arises under a given vector of service levels (prices) and show how the former vary as a function of the latter. These second stage "price-only" and "service only" competition models are of interest by themselves in settings where one of the two strategic variables is specified in a way different than through non-cooperative competition.
We are not able to guarantee that the equilibrium is unique. In general, the existence of multiple equilibria is unsettling, as it is hard to predict which of the equilibria is adopted by the industry. We show, however, that, in our model, the set of equilibria always has a component-wise largest and a component-wise smallest pair of equilibrium vectors. In other words, there exists a Nash equilibrium pair of price-service level vectors such that each firm's price as well as its service level is higher, and there exists a Nash equilibrium pair of vectors such that these are lower than his price and service level under any other Nash equilibrium. Most importantly, the component-wise largest pair of price and service level vectors is in fact preferred by all of the firms. Finally, the schemes used to compute an equilibrium can also be applied to verify numerically whether multiple equilibria exist. Evaluating thousands of instances across a broad spectrum of parameters, we have never encountered a case with multiple equilibria.
The set of equilibria is identical under the Simultaneous Competition model (SC) and the Price-First game (PF). Moreover, each firm's equilibrium service level in any such equilibrium is uniquely determined as a function of that firm's characteristics only, and is 1 See e.g. Vives (2001) , page 15, "non existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is pervasive in oligopoly models" 2 A firm's strategy space is essentially multi-dimensional, if each of the strategy variables (e.g. price and service level) impacts on all firms' profit functions and these strategy variables cannot be replaced by a single aggregate variable (e.g. the full price)
3 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, p 131) : "it is typically, much easier to characterize the open-loop equilibria of a given situation, than the closed-loop ones." a dominant choice for this firm, i.e., with fixed prices, the equilibrium service level is the firm's optimal choice, regardless of what service levels are adopted by its competitors.
In contrast, the equilibrium in the Service Level First model differs from that in the other two competition models. Here, a firm's equilibrium service level does depend, in general, on the characteristics of the competitors. Assuming the (SF) model has a unique equilibrium, we derive, in fact, a simple sufficient condition under which each firm adopts a higher price and a higher service level while enjoying higher demand volume, compared with the equilibrium choices under the other types of competition. In the presence of multiple equilibria, the same uniform ranking applies to the component-wise smallest equilibria. Thus, if firms choose and announce their service levels before choosing their price, this will result in higher, but more expensive service by all competitors. Since all firms' demand volumes increase as well, this type of competition appears to benefit the consumer. It also suggests that value is added to the consumer when government agencies, industry consortia or independent organizations periodically report on service levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in §2 we review the relevant literature. The model and notation are introduced in §3. The three competition models (SC),(PF) and (SF) are analyzed in §4, §5 and §6, respectively. §7 establishes the above comparisons of the equilibrium in the three competition modes. In §8 we report on a numerical study. §9 completes the paper with concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Naor's (1969) seminal paper first addressed the fact that customers of a service industry tradeoff the value or benefit they derive from the service with the cost of waiting, possibly in combination with other service attributes. The cost of waiting is assumed to be proportional to the waiting time at a uniform cost rate. In this model there is a single service provider who acts as an M/M/1 system. Potential customers are able to observe the actual queue length and they decide to enter the system if and only if their full net value= value -direct price -cost of waiting is non-negative. It is shown that in equilibrium customers enter the system whenever the queue size is below a certain threshold and that the first-best, socially optimal, demand rate can be induced by a proper selection of the direct price.
As mentioned, Luski (1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) were the first to model price competition between multiple service providers. These papers consider a duopoly, where each of the firms acts as an M/M/1 system, with a given, identical service rate.
As in Naor (1969) , potential customers derive a uniform value from either service, and select which firm to patronize, if any, on the basis of the full net value or equivalently the full price. Unable to observe the actual queue length, customers base the cost of waiting on the expected waiting times. In contrast to Naor (1969) , different potential customers have a different cost rates for the time spent waiting; the customers' cost rates are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with a given common distribution.
The authors compute equilibrium price-pairs for a given set of problem instances and compare these with the first-best as well as the consumer welfare maximizing prices. As mentioned, it was only recently, that Chen and Wan (2000) established that this model always has an equilibrium, albeit that the equilibrium may fail to be unique. The authors also establish that no equilibrium may exist if the service rates are different, and that the equilibrium is rather unstable with respect to changes in some of the model parameters. Loch (1991) considers a variant of the Levhari and Luski model where customers share a common waiting time cost rate, but the total demand rate for service is given by a general function of the full price. Allowing for general but still identical service time distributions, the author shows that a symmetric equilibrium pair of prices exists, regardless of whether the two firms target prices directly (Bertrand competition) or indirectly via the demand rates (Cournot competition).
Other variants of the Levhari and Luski model include Lee and Li (1992) , Lederer and Li (1997) and Armony and Haviv (2003) . Lee and Li (1992) consider the case where consumers can observe both firms' queue length upon arrival and are allowed to jockey instantaneously between the firms. Lederer and Li (1997) consider an arbitrary number of competing firms, but assume customers are partitioned into a finite number of classes, each with its own waiting time cost rate. The total demand rate for each customer class is given by a general function of the class' full price. As an application of the well known cµ-rule it is clearly optimal for every firm to prioritize among the customers in accordance with their cost rate. Each of the firms selects a volume rate for each customer class.
Lederer and Li show that a Nash equilibrium exists in which no individual customer of any class has an incentive to switch to a different firm in order to reduce his full price or even to misrepresent his class identity. Mendelson and Shneorson's (2003) model for the competition between internet service network operators, may be viewed as an adaptation of the Lederer and Li (1997) Several other papers assume that service firms compete in terms of their capacity choices with exogenously given prices, in contrast to the above competition models in which firms compete in terms of their prices, with fixed capacity levels. Kalai et al. (1992) consider a service industry that is modelled as an M/M/2 queueing system with two competing servers or service firms, i.e. all customers are served on a FIFO basis from a single queue. (If a customer arrives when both servers are idle, he is randomly assigned to one of them). The authors show that asymmetric Nash equilibria of service rate pairs may arise, sometimes associated with infinite waiting times. Christ and Avi-Itzhak (2002) show that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists in a variant of this model in which the two service providers are equally expensive, but only a queue length dependent fraction of arriving customers actually joins the queue. Gilbert and Weng (1998) consider a different variant in which the customers, upon arrival, can choose which firm to patronize. The Poisson arrival stream is therefore split so as to equalize expected waiting times at both firms. In this case, a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium pair of service rates exists under a regularity condition for the capacity cost functions. Cachon and Zhang (2003) generalizes Gilbert and Weng (1998) to allow for routing probabilities that depend on the providers' service rates according to more general (allocation) schemes.
De Vany and Saving (1983) is the first paper to address a richer type of competition in which firms compete with several rather than a single strategic instrument. This paper addresses a variant of the Levhari and Luski model with an arbitrary number of identical firms who simultaneously choose a price and service rate. All customers share the same waiting cost rate , but the total demand volume in the industry is given by a general function of the lowest full price. They establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Reitman (1991) addresses the Levhari and Luski model itself, albeit with an arbitrary number of identical competitors simultaneously choosing a price as well as a service rate.
He shows that if an equilibrium exists it is usually asymmetric.
Note that all of the above papers assume that customers either have no choice in selecting their service provider, or make the selection on the basis of the full price only. So (2000) and Cachon and Harker (2002) are the first to analyze a model in which other service attributes matter along with the full price. Cachon and Harker (2002) assume that in a duopoly with two M/M/1 service providers, the demand rate of each firm is given by a general function of both firms' full prices, with a particular emphasis on linear and truncated Logit functions. In other words, this model allows for equilibria in which the firms offer distinct full prices, yet each captures a positive part of the market. Nevertheless, this model continues to assume that the price and waiting time attributes can be aggregated into a single measure, i.e. the full price. See §1 for a discussion of different types of equilibrium behavior that arise in this model.
In a similar spirit, So (2000) establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium with an arbitrary number of competing M/M/1 service firms, when the demand rate functions are specified as a special type of attraction model, see for instance Bell et al (1975) .
Here, each firm is characterized by a so called attraction value specified as a function of the firm's price and waiting time standard; With a fixed total market size, each firm's We refer to Hassin and Haviv (2003) for a general survey of queueing models with competition, and to Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) and Hall and Porteus (2000) as well as the references therein, for other types of price and service competition.
The Model
Consider a service industry with N competing service firms, each acting as an M/M/1 facility. Each firm i positions itself in the market by selecting a price p i as well as a service level θ i . The latter may either be defined in terms of the expected (steady state) waiting time w i = E(W i ), or in terms of a given, say, φ fractile of the waiting time distribution, w i (φ), 0 < φ < 1. For a given service rate µ i and a given demand volume λ i , it is well known that
i , from which the expression for w i (φ) in (1) readily follows) The service level θ i is defined as the difference between a benchmark upper bound w or w(φ), and the actual waiting time standard w i or w i (φ) respectively,
Each firm i is able to select its capacity or service rate so as to guarantee any given waiting time standard between 0 and w (or 0 and w(φ) when standards are specified in terms of the φ fractile of the waiting time distribution). Thus, θ i ∈ [0, w]. The required value of µ i is easily obtained from (1)
Each firm i incurs a given cost c i per customer served and a cost γ i per unit of capacity, per unit of time. If the waiting time standard is based on the φ fractile of the waiting time distribution and firm i offers to pay a penalty C i to any customer whose waiting time is in excess of the stated w i (φ), this adds an expected cost per customer (1 − φ)C i .
Such penalties are therefore easily incorporated into the analysis, simply by replacing c i 
As to p max i
, it is chosen to be sufficiently large as to have no impact on the equilibrium behavior. The demand rate faced by retailer i, i = 1, . . . , N is given by a separable function of all prices and service levels in the industry, which in addition is linear in the price vector:
The functions a i (θ i ) are assumed to be three times differentiable, increasing, and concave in the service level θ i , i.e., equal size reductions in the waiting time standard result in progressively smaller increases of the demand volume. As to the cross term functions α ij (θ j ), they are merely assumed to be non-decreasing and differentiable. Without loss of practical generality, we assume that a uniform price increase by all N firms cannot result in an increase in any firm's demand volume, i.e.
a condition that is usually referred to as the "Dominant Diagonal" condition. Similarly, a price increase by a given firm cannot result in an increase of the industry's aggregate demand volume, i.e.
Thus, if the waiting time standards are expressed in terms of the expected waiting time, each firm i's long run average profit Π i is given by the function:
If the waiting time standard is expressed in terms of the φ fractile of the waiting time distribution, the profit functions Π i are identical to those in (5) except that the last term to the right of (5) is given by
. In view of the close similarity between the profit functions under the expected waiting time and waiting time fractile-based standards, we henceforth confine ourselves to the former case. Finally, one may envision settings where customers are sensitive to both the expected waiting time and a given φ fractile of the waiting time distribution, giving rise to demand equations of the form
Since
. This general setting with customers sensitive to multiple waiting time standards can thus be reduced, without loss of generality, to a model with a single waiting time standard.
As mentioned in §1, Cachon and Harker (2002) consider, in the case of a duopoly, all have contributed to demonstrate that both assumptions are often violated. Through their "calculator and jacket" experiment, Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) seminal paper demonstrated that the amount of time an individual is willing to spend in order to reduce the purchase price of an item by $1, may vary drastically depending on the item involved. This demonstrates that even on an individual level, no uniform waiting cost rate (k) prevails . This experiment has been confirmed in many other papers; see for example Leclerc et al (1995) and the references therein. Other experiments in Leclerc et al (1995) and others indicate that the perceived "cost" associated with a time loss depends on whether the time loss occurs in one single shot, or is spread over time, once again, defying the full price aggregation scheme. Carmon et al (1994) focus on the need to represent the cost of waiting as a non-linear function of the amount of time waited.
As a final example, Larson's (1987) experiments reveal that the "disutility" of waiting in queue varies in a highly non-linear manner with the customer's delay as well as with many characteristics of the "queueing environment".
We retrieve the full price model from the general demand model (4) by adopting the following special choices:
In other words, all intercept functions are linear and their slopes proportional to the price effects b and β with k as the "common proportionality factor"
5
. Unless the special relationships in (7) and (8) (7) and (8) 
= 2 for all i = j. i.e. the instance allows for a full price aggregation in which the cost of waiting one unit of time equals $2 for all customers, no matter where on the service spectrum a firm is positioned. (Note that the full price
Thus, all three firms experience identical total marginal cost rates (c+γ) per customer served, but firm 3's capacity cost rate γ 3 is significantly higher, while his non-capacity related cost rate, c 3 ,is significantly lower than that of his two competitors. This scenario may apply, for example, when firm 3 is an established domestic or local service provider and firms 1 and 2 are competitors that have entered the local market more recently at a foreign or remote location, where capacity costs (γ) are lower, but the per customer access costs (c) are higher. Since firm 3 is more established, or since it is favored because of its "local" identity, it captures, under identical prices and service levels, a larger demand volume than the more recent or "foreign" entrants, firms 1 and
Note from (5) that, for a given total cost rate c + γ, one is better off with a lower capacity cost rate γ.
In Table 1 ]. Thus, each consecutive instance is designed to generate some what larger deviations from the full price model. Note that the relatively small deviations from a perfect full price model often result in quite significant changes in the equilibrium prices, waiting times, profits, etc. The implication is that, when estimating demand functions, as in (4), significant distortions may arise when imposing the restrictions (7) and (8), associated with a full price model.
Similarly, the full price model assumes that a reduction of a firm's waiting time standard by one unit of time is always equivalent to a price reduction by $k. To appreciate the importance of non-linear substitution effects between price and service levels, replace
, . . . . Observe that under the perturbed intercept functions, ever larger service level improvements are required to compensate for a constant price increase (so as to maintain a given demand volume). The larger the value of h, the more pronounced the non-linearity in the substitution effects. Table 2 , again, displays equilibrium prices, waiting times, demand volumes and profits for firms 1 and 3, as those pertaining to firm 2 are equal to firm 1's. Once again, the impact of small non-linear terms can be significant. 
Simultaneous Competition
In this section we show that under Simultaneous Competition an equilibrium exists, as long as the upper bound benchmark for the waiting time standard, w, is not excessively 
Proof. (4) and (5) that
Thus,
, where the last equality follows from a i > 0 and a i decreasing.
To show that an equilibrium satisfies (9) and (10), note from (11) ] and must therefore satisfy (9). Also, from (12) 
(w−θ i ) 2 = ∞, and this unique root maximizes the function).
Thus, the only condition for the existence of an equilibrium is that the upper bound benchmark for the waiting time standard fall below the specified critical value. Alternatively, if w exceeds this value, it is sufficient that all service levels be chosen above a minimum threshold value w > 0. Condition (9) shows that in equilibrium, a firm's variable margin p i − c i − γ i is proportional to its demand volume. In particular, when all b i coefficients are identical, a service provider is able ro achieve a large demand volume if and only if he is able to obtain a large profit margin. The equilibrium conditions (9) may also be written in the form
, where * ii denotes the demand elasticity of firm i with respect to changes in its own price p i . Thus a firm's markup expressed as a fraction of its sales price -often referred to as the Lerner index, see for instance Tirole (1989) -is, in equilibrium, given by the reciprocal of the absolute value of the demand elasticity. In other words, the equilibrium conditions (9) represent a manifestation of the so called inverse elasticity rule, identified in many simpler oligopoly models, see Tirole (1989, p. 70 ).
As to a firm's equilibrium service level, note from (10) that it only depends on its own characteristics and its own price. Employing the implicit function theorem, one observes that a firm's equilibrium service level increases with its equilibrium price: for
, θ * increases concavely with p * i , as follows directly from the second derivative of θ i (·). (10) may be used to substitute all service level variables in (9), resulting in a system of non-linear equations in the price vector p only. It is, unfortunately, not easy to solve this system directly; moreover, the possibility of multiple solutions cannot be excluded a priori. In the next section we will however design a simple algorithm to compute the equilibrium price vector(s) p * by showing that the same vector(s) is also an equilibrium in a different competition model. Again, once the equilibrium vector p * has been computed, the associated equilibrium service level are immediately obtained from (10). Cachon and Harker (2002) addressed, for duopolies with N = 2 firms the special case of a full price model which arises under the restrictions (7) and (8) 
condition can, after some algebra, be shown to be equivalent to
The analysis is based on the authors showing that the game is equivalent to one in which each firm competes with a single instrument, i.e., the full price as opposed to the pair
Its reduced profit function is:
where the last equality follows by replacing w i with the unconstrained optimum of the EOQ function in squared brackets
7
. Theorem 1 shows that an equilibrium always exists ( as long as waiting time standards cannot be chosen at excessively large values) in the general model (4) and in the full price model, in particular.
Price First Model
In the Simultaneous Competition model (SC), firms select or adapt their prices and service levels (hence their capacities) simultaneously. This assumption is valid when it is equally easy or equally difficult to adapt either one of the two strategic dimensions.
Often, firms face significantly higher stickiness in terms of their service levels or capacity as compared to their ability to vary prices, or vice versa. ) is an optimal service level choice for firm i, regardless of the choices made by any of its 
Proof. The fact that θ(p 
We establish a simple one-to-one correspondence between the equilibria of the Price First competition model (PF) and those of the Simultaneous Competition model (SC). 
. where the last inequality follows from the fact that θ i (p i ) is the optimal service level choice for firm i given the firm chooses the price p i . Also, for j = i, θ * j = θ j (p * j ) does not depend on firm i's choices, thus verifying the last equality.
is an equilibrium in PF model. 
Thus, in the SC game, firm i can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by selecting the pair Corollary 2 does not guarantee that the equilibrium is unique. In view of Theorem 2, all we know is that an equilibrium p * must satisfy the system of N non-linear equations that results after substituting in (10) all variables θ i by the functions θ i (p i ). As mentioned in §4, it is not apparent how this system is to be solved directly. In the fol- 
(Note that all other terms in (15) depend on a single price variable only). For
≥ 0, where the first inequality follows from the concavity of a j (·) and the last inequality from the bound for w.
(b) and (c) Immediate from the fact that the first stage game is supermodular, see Topkis (1998) .
The tatônnement scheme reduces to the repeated optimization of the single variable , a bound similar to the one assumed in Theorem 3. Verification of this statement follows a general argument in Theorem 7 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) :
). The first inequality follows from the fact that p 1 is a Nash equilibrium. The second inequality follows from the fact that π i is increasing in p j , see the proof of Theorem 3(c).
The equivalence between the Price First model and the Simultaneous Competition model, established in Theorem 2, also allows us to characterize the equilibria of the latter. 
. The set of equilibria in the Simultaneous Competition model contains a component-wise smallest pair (p, θ) and a component-wise largest pair
(p, θ), i.e., for any equilibrium (p * , θ * ): p i ≤ p * i ≤ p i ; θ i ≤ θ * i ≤ θ i , i = 1, . . . , Nθ ≤ θ * ≤ θ follow from θ = θ(p), θ * = θ(p * ), θ = θ
(p) and the monotonicity of the θ(·)
vector function , see (10).
Service Level First Model
In this section we analyze the Service Level First model which arises when firms select and adapt their service (and associated capacity) levels less frequently then their prices.
(See the discussion at the beginning of §5.) To analyze this two stage game we start with the second stage price game which arises under a given vector of service levels θ 0
Price Competition Model
We show that the price-competition game has a unique price equilibrium p * , which, as in Theorem, 1 satisfies the system of equations (9).In matrix notation, the linear system of equations can be written in the form
where
We first state the following properties of the matrix A which were shown in parts is nondecreasing in each of the β ij coefficients.
We refer to δ i as the degree of positive externality faced by firm i and note from Lemma 1 that it is a dimensionless index which varies between 0.5 and 1 and increases with each of the β coefficients.
In view of Lemma 1, the solution to the system of equations (17) is given by 
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium in the price competition model and shows how the equilibrium prices and demand rates respond to changes in the cost parameters and service levels. ] and hence a sublattice of the real line. As discussed, these two observations imply, by definition, that the price competition game is supermodular.
(a(θ) + κ). The equilibrium demand volume for firm i is given by λ
* i ≡ λ i (p * ) = b i (p * i − c i − γ i )
and its equilibrium profit for firm i is given by π
The fact that it has a unique equilibrium follows from (D), see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) or Topkis (1998 (a(θ) + κ) and (19) guarantees that it lies in this region.
Rewriting (17) and using (4) we obtain λ *
and by (5):
(b) The fact that each equilibrium price p * i is increasing in each of the cost parameters
) ii = δ i by Lemma 1(b). Finally, it follows from part (a)
Thus, if one of the cost parameters c i or γ i of firm i increases, the equilibrium price p * i increases by at least half as much, but never more than by the increase in the cost parameter itself. Moreover, the marginal price increase is given by the firm's degree of positive externality δ i and is therefore increasing in any of the β-coefficients. Just like the equilibrium prices and volumes vary unimodally, and often monotonically with any of the service levels, the same can be said about the dependence of the firm's equilibrium profits on any of its competitors' service levels: it follows from (22) that
. In particular, in view of (19) 
The Service Level First Model: The Two Stage Game
We now turn to the first stage game in which firms first select their service levels. 
and
The first term in (25) is negative under linear or convex cross term functions {α ij , j = i}.
where the last equality follows from p * i (θ i ) being decreasing. Finally, the fact that p * i (θ i ) is decreasing shows that condition (26) is satisfied for w sufficiently small.
To guarantee that a tatônnement scheme converges to an equilibrium (as well as to characterize the set of equilibria in case more than one equilibrium exists), it is, again, necessary to establish that the first stage game is supermodular. If follows from (23) 
As discussed above, in general, a firm's equilibrium price fails to be monotone either in its own service level or that of any of its competitors. By (21):
In other words, condition (27) requires that the direct impact of a service level improvement by firm j on its own demand volume be as large as a linear combination of the indirect effects this service level improvement has on the demand volumes of the other firms. This condition bears resemblance to (D') which states that the direct impact of a price increase by a firm on its own demand volume be at least as large as the sum of the indirect effects the price increase has on the demand volumes of the competitors. (Recall that (D') is equivalent to the highly plausible assumption that a price increase by one of the firms cannot result in an increase of the aggregate sales in the industry.) Arguably, the relative magnitude of the indirect effects of a firm's service level improvement on the demand volumes of its competitors (expressed as a fraction of the direct effect on his own demand volume) is, in general, small and in any case smaller than the relative magnitude of the indirect effects of a price decrease by this firm: since service levels are harder to observe and to characterize than prices, a service level improvement by one of the firms is less likely to draw customers who used to patronize a competing provider towards this firm. Moreover,to the extent that the indirect service sensitivities {α kj , k = j} are significant compared to the direct service level sensitivity a j , this reflects a highly competitive industry and is likely to be accompanied with indirect price sensitivities {β kj } being relatively large, compared to the direct price sensitivity b j . However , the inequalities
are sufficient for (27) . These inequalities are all the more easily satisfied as (any of) the β coefficient(s) increase (s) 
In the k + 1st iteration of the scheme, each firm i determines the value of θ which maximizes π
* i (θ i |θ k −i ) = b i (p * i (θ i , θ k −i ) − c i − γ i ) 2 − γ i w−θ i .
A Comparison Of Equilibria In The Three Competition Models
As shown in Theorem 2, the PF and SC models share the same set of equilibria. In other words, prior knowledge of the firms' price levels has no impact on their equilibrium service level choices. The same fails to be true, however, when comparing the equilibria in the SF model with those in the other two competition models. In this section, we
show that under a variant of condition (27), the SF model results in higher prices and higher service levels for all firms.
Thus, if firms make their strategic decisions sequentially, selecting service levels, hence waiting time guarantees and associated capacities first, this results in an equilibrium with higher service levels and higher prices, as compared to the equilibrium reached in the SC model. In the economics literature, the former equilibrium is referred to as a "closed loop" equilibrium and the latter as an "open loop" equilibrium, terms coined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) . As stated on page 131 ibid, "it is typically, much easier to characterize the open-loop equilibria of a given situation, than the closed-loop ones.". It is even rarer to find an efficient procedure to compute the closed-loop equilibrium and to demonstrate that it always results in component-wise larger or smaller choices. The fact that the Service Level First competition model always results in a larger investment in service levels and hence in capacity, is a phenomenon referred to as the "fat cat" effect, another term coined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) . Like a "fat cat", the firms are inclined to "overinvest" in capacity in order to deter the competitors in the subsequent price competition.
Interestingly, the same phenomenon fails to occur in the Price First Competition model;
that is, when competitors learn up-front about the firms' price choices, this does not provide an incentive to either "underprice" or "overprice" compared to the Simultaneous Competition model. Instead, the exact same equilibrium arises. 
To verify the latter inequality, note from Theorem 2 that (p P F , θ(p P F )) is an equilibrium in the Simultaneous Competition model so that p P F is the price equilibrium in the price competition game which arises under the fixed service level vector θ(p P F ). Thus
by (27) . We now show, by induction that for all k ≥ 0
28) holds for k = 0. Assume therefore that (28)holds for some k ≥ 0. To show that it holds for k + 1 as well, note from Theorem 3(c) that
P F where the inequality follows from the fact that the θ(·) function is increasing. It thus suffices to show that
Per definition,
= arg max
where the second equality follows from (15) and the last one from the induction assump-
The first equality follows from the definition of θ k+1 i,P F and the second one from
and the fact that p k+1 i,P F is the largest maximizer of the function to the left of (30). Thus, to establish (29) and hence to complete the induction step it suffices to show that the
) defined in the lemma represents the largest maximizer of the function to the right of (32). Observe that the function within curled brackets to the right of (32) is a quadratic function in p i , i.e. the unconstrained maximizer of this function is
and since
it is its constrained maximizer as well. (The first and last inequalities follow from (20) and the second one from the definition of a (32) is also the largest maximizer of
In other words, the values (p In conclusion, to compute the equilibria in the PF model (and hence in the SC model), it is considerably easier to employ the scheme in Lemma 2 as opposed to the basic tatônnement scheme applied to the PF model. While this scheme continues to require that in each iteration for each firm,a non-linear single variable function be maximized, at least this function is now given in a simple closed form. In the important special case where the a i (·) functions are affine, the roots of the first derivative of each of the functions (27) which maintains the inequalities for i = j, but restricts those for i = j: Proof. We show by induction that
By (36) and the monotonicity of p * (·) under (35), hence (27), this establishes p 
To show the sufficiency of (38), recall that θ 
Using Theorem 4(a) and (27) we obtain that (38) is equivalent to
Both sides of the inequality are given as a product of two factors. Since the factors to the left of the inequality are easily seen to be positive, as is the first factor to its right, it suffices to show that the first (second) factor to the left dominates the first (second) factor to its right:
(40) coincides with the second inequality in (35), while To complete the induction proof, note that p * Theorem 6 ranks the component-wise smallest equilibria in the various competition models, and is therefore somewhat inconclusive with respect to other equilibria in case the SC model fails to have a unique equilibrium. However, in all instances evaluated in our numerical study, the SC model has a unique equilibrium and so does the SF model; the former equilibrium is therefore indeed component-wise smaller than the latter. The tatônnement scheme can be viewed as a possible dynamic adjustment process by which the firms adopt their choices and converge to an equilibrium, in addition to it serving as an efficient algorithm for its computation. Indeed, as stated in Vives (page 49), "although this adjustment process can (and has) been criticized for being ad hoc, it can also be interpreted as a crude way of expressing the bounded rationality of agents". The proof of Theorem 6 shows that under this dynamic adjustment process, the service levels and prices adopted under the SF setting are larger than those under SC and PF competition, at each stage of the adjustment process, and not just in equilibrium.
While we have argued that condition (27), and hence (35) are likely to hold, it may sometimes be violated. The following example shows that the ranking between the equilibria in the three competition models, as specified by Theorem 6, may fail to apply when condition (35) is violated. have identical characteristics and the more established firm 3 captures under identical prices and service levels a larger demand volume (a 3 (θ) − a 1 (θ) = a 3 (θ) − a 2 (θ) = 90).
In Table 3 we evaluate 6 instances by combining three values for η, (η = 0, 0.01, 0.05) with two values for , ( = 0, 0.04), referring to the case η = = 0 as the base case.
Since firms 1 and 2 are identical, we report equilibrium prices, demand volumes, waiting times and profits for firms 1 and 3, under the Service Level First (SF) and Price First or Simultaneous Competition (PF). In all instances, both the PF and SF models have a unique equilibrium, since the respective tatônnement schemes converge to the same limits irrespective of their starting points. Condition (27) Table 3 show however, that the opposite may occur. As either or η is increased, the equilibrium prices increase under SF competition, but they decrease under PF.
Numerical Study
In this section we report on a numerical study conducted to provide insights into the following questions: (III) If customers become increasingly sensitive to the service level offered (as is the case in many service industries), will firms respond by offering higher prices and higher service levels and will they increasingly differentiate themselves along the service dimension?
To address these questions we investigate instances obtained from the base case in Turning our attention to question (II), we first consider the impact of variations in the c parameter. In Table 4 , we have evaluated the base case of Example 2 along with 5 others in which the marginal cost rate per customer is lower than 20 for firm 1 or firm 2 (or both), resulting in a lower total marginal cost rate c + γ than (the established, local) firm 3, along with a lower marginal capacity cost rate γ. We report the same performance measures as in Table 3 , now for all 3 firms, as in some of the instances firms 1 and 2 cease to be identical. Consider for example, the second instance in which firm 1's cost rate is reduced from 20 to 10. This cost reduction allows firm 1 to offer a lower price along with a lower waiting time. Firm 1's price reduction comes in conjunction with smaller price reductions by its competitors; thus firm 1's cost reduction results in a larger gross profit margin for itself, but lower gross profit margins for its competitors 8 . Interestingly, while firms 2 and 3 follow firm 1 in reducing their prices, they adopt higher, instead of lower waiting times. Thus firms 2 and 3 are compelled to reduce their capacity cost and to lower their service levels so as to compensate for the decrease in gross profits answering question (II), again, in the negative.
In the base scenario, firm 3 positions himself, under all 3 types of competition, with a significantly higher price and waiting time than its two competitors. Nevertheless, the advantage of firm 3's incumbency, as expressed by its larger constant term in the demand equation, allows it to capture a 28% larger demand volume and a 75% larger profit. In the second instance the cost advantage for firm 1 is now sufficiently large to more than offset the incumbency advantage that firm 3 enjoys. The cost reduction at firm 1 has negligible impact on the total demand in the market, but firm 1 now attracts a market
share of approximately 40% (instead of 30%) and the 18% reduction in its total cost rate, allows firm 1 to increase its profits by as much as 89%.
The above phenomenon of firms adjusting their service levels in opposite directions applies equally to changes in the capacity cost rates: Table 5 reports on 5 new instances obtained from the base case by varying γ 3 . As γ 3 decreases, firm 3 is able to offer a lower price and a lower waiting time under all types of competition. Firms 1 and 2's prices decline along with that of firm 3. However, firms 1 and 2 respond, for reasons explained above, to the reduction in firm 3's expected waiting time by adjusting their waiting times upwards.
To investigate the impact of increasing sensitivity to service level improvements (see question (III)), we vary in When a increases, the larger weight attributed to the service dimension, permits the firms to be significantly less competitive in terms of the prices. At the same time, the waiting times are reduced even more dramatically; for example when going from a = 0.1 to a = 1 waiting times are reduced by more than fourfold. Note also that as a increases, the relative difference between the prices decreases, while that between the service levels increases. As a increases, firms choose to differentiate themselves increasingly along the service level dimension while reducing their differentiation along the price dimension.
In the theoretical analysis in sections 4-7, we have systematically considered the possibility of multiple Nash equilibria, since it is hard or impossible to exclude this phenomenon on a priori grounds. As mentioned, the existence of a unique equilibrium can be established numerically by verifying that the tatônnement scheme converges to the same limit irrespective of its starting point. Using this test, we have verified in all of thousands of instances that the "problem" of multiple equilibria does not arise.
Moreover, we have observed that the tatônnement schemes converge very rapidly to the occurs after no more than 5 iterations with SF models, and no more than 8 in the other two models.
The rapid rate of convergence enhances our confidence that markets, in the absence of collusion, rapidly adopt the (unique) Nash equilibrium.
We conclude this section with an example of the sequence of price and waiting time vectors adopted by the tatônnement scheme in the PF/SC model, applied to an instance obtained from the base case in Table 1 , by replacing the slopes of a i (·) to a 1 = a 2 = 0.003 and a 3 = 0.006, and setting α ij = 0 for all i = j. Table 7 for all prices and waiting times. In this instance, firm 3 is progressively forced to reduce its initial gross profit margin of $9.40 to 67 cents only and as a consequence is forced to reduce its service level down to zero. This is an instance displaying cutthroat competition between the firms whose profits end up more than a 100 times lower than if they were able to collude by adopting the initial configuration. Competition results in a major reduction in the prices, but is complemented with waiting times close to 4 times larger than in the initial configuration.
Conclusions
We have proposed and analyzed a general model describing competition between service providers, each of which operates as an M/M/1 service system. The model specification reflects the fact that customers select a specific service provider by trading off 3 categories of service attributes: (1) the price (2) a waiting time standard (3) all other attributes. We have defined a firm's service level as the difference between an upper bound benchmark for the waiting time standard (w) and the firm's actual waiting time standard. The demand rate faced by a given firm is a separable function of all prices and service levels in the industry, which in addition is linear in the price vector. Price and waiting time are treated as truly independent attributes, in that, in general, a change in a firm's waiting time (distribution) can not be complemented for with a price change that will leave all firms' demand volume unchanged.
We have given systematic treatment to the three possible ways in which prices and service levels may be selected in a non-cooperative way: ( While it is difficult to guarantee a unique equilibrium, on the basis of a priori parameter conditions, we can guarantee that in the presence of multiple equilibria there is one which is component-wise largest in all prices and service levels, and this equilibrium is preferred by all firms. In the SF case, this result requires a simple condition which bounds the magnitude of the indirect effects a firm's marginal service level improvement has on the demand volume of other firms, relative to the magnitude of the direct effect this service level improvement has on the firm's own demand. We have also identified a sim-ple numerical procedure to test whether multiple equilibria exist and to compute these equilibria. Most importantly, when applied to a very large set of problem instances,
we have never encountered a case where multiple equilibria exist. The computational (tatônnement) schemes also show that an off equilibrium industry rapidly converges towards equilibrium via basic dynamic adjustments by the firms, further strengthening our confidence in the predictive value of the Nash equilibrium.
SC and PF result in identical equilibria, but the SF competition model results in general in a different equilibrium. Moreover, under a variant of the above mentioned condition, we have shown that all firms adopt higher prices and higher service levels under SF as compared to the other two types of competition. This is a manifestation of the so called "fat cat" phenomenon, a term coined by Fudenberg and Tirole, and extensively discussed in the industrial organization literature, however ,primarily, for duopolies with a single early incumbent and a single entrant.
In the process of analyzing the two-stage competition models, Price First and Service Level First, we have characterized the equilibrium behavior in the price competition model which arises under an exogenously given vector of service level and the service level competition model which arises under a fixed price vector. Both of these models are guaranteed to have a unique equilibrium. In the former, we provide a complete comperative statics characterization, showing, among others, how each of the firm's equilibrium price, demand volumes and profit values respond to a change in his own service level or that of any of his competitors. In the service level competition model, we show that a (unique) dominant solution exists and that each firm's service level choice only depends on its own characteristics and its own price level.
In our numerical explorations we have given special attention to the special case of full price models which arise when all customers aggregate price and waiting time standards by applying a uniform cost rate for each unit of time waited. We have shown that relatively small deviations from a full price instance result in important changes in the the equilibrium behavior of the industry.
Our numerical study also illustrates how the impact of the "other attributes" may allow some firms to position themselves with higher prices and lower service levels than all its competitors, and nevertheless, maintain significant and sometimes even dominant market shares. We have also exhibited significant qualitative differences in the equilibrium behavior between the case where the demand rates depend linearly on the service levels and that where the dependence is non-linear, reflecting decreasing marginal benefits to scale. The numerical study in §8 focuses on 3 general managerial questions (I)-(III).
It reveals somewhat counterintuitive findings, e.g. that firms do not necessarily benefit when competing with additional information, as under SF and PF competition, compared to SC. The phenomenon may arise even in settings, where under SF, say, firms are guaranteed to offer higher prices (as well as service levels) along with higher demand volumes. In these settings the uniformly larger demand volumes suggest that the customers do arise as the beneficiaries of the sequential competition process.
Future work should explore whether the above results continue to apply when service providers face more complex (than M/M/1) queuing systems, or when the demand functions allow for more general non-linear dependencies than those captured by the current demand model.
